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Abstract: This paper incorporates assignment frictions and sector-specific training into the Roy model of 
occupational choice. Assignment frictions represent the extent of the market whereas differences in 
sector-specific training reflect worker specialization. This framework thus captures Adam Smith’s idea that 
the extent of the market determines the division of labor. The paper demonstrates the way in which the 
relationship between assignment frictions and specialization affects the level and composition of human 
capital acquisition, aggregate output, and the distribution of income. Not surprisingly, economywide 
training, output, and specialization increase as the extent of the market increases. The distribution of 
these gains, however, is uneven. Within group or residual income, distribution does not converge 
monotonically as search frictions diminish. Comparisons across groups reveal that these effects can 
become more pronounced as average income increases. 
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"There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be carried on 
no where but in a great town. ... In the lone houses and very small villages which 
are scattered about in so desert a country as the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer 
must be butcher, baker, brewer for his own family. ... The scattered families that 
live eight or ten miles distance from the nearest of them, must learn to perform 
themselves a great number of little pieces of work, for which, in more populous 
countries, they would call in the assistance of those workmen." (Adam Smith, The 
Wealth of Nations, p. 17)  
Since Adam Smith if not before, the determination and distribution of labor market 
earnings have occupied the attention of economists. Recently, a vast literature has 
emerged establishing that earnings inequality in the US and elsewhere has grown 
dramatically over the last four decades. During the 1980's and 1990's inequality across 
groups deepened considerably while within group (or residual) inequality has also grown 
markedly since the 1970s. (See Katz and Autor, 1999, and Machin and van Reenen, 
2007, for a survey and overview.) Although debate continues notably regarding the most 
recent trends (Card and DiNardo, 2002, Lemieux, 2006, Sattinger 2007), skilled biased 
technological change appears to be the most plausible cause for the rising spread in 
earnings across groups. 
Unfortunately, skilled biased technological change, as well as other prominent 
explanations, offers little help in understanding the changes in residual wage disparity.
1 
To address this shortcoming, this paper presents a model of earnings that incorporates 
labor market frictions and sector specific training into a Roy model of occupational 
choice.
2 
Suppose workers choose how much training to acquire for potential jobs before 
investigating and then choosing among available employment options in different 
                                                 
1 Unobserved differences among workers is perhaps the most compelling argument (Lemieux, 2006), but 
this explanation is by its very nature difficult to test. Theories that build upon market frictions and the 
sharing of quasi-rents offer an alternative approach. See Van Reenen (1996), Lloyd-Ellis (1999), Casselli 
(1999) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2004). 
 
2 Specialization in the Roy model without personal investments and without assignment frictions has been 
examined in detail. See Heckman and Honore (1990), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), Willis and Rosen 
(1979) for expositions of the way in which self-selection affects the distribution of income and empirical 
evaluation of wage functions among individuals with heterogeneous abilities. Eleftheriou (2008) examines 
wage inequality in the Roy model with matching frictions but does not consider human capital investments 
or derive analytic results.    3
occupations. Following Adam Smith's lead, the likelihood with which an agent trades in a 
particular occupation, modeled here through assignment frictions, reflects the extent of 
the market for different occupations.
3 Agents take account of these frictions in their 
choices. The extent of the market determines not only training investments and the degree 
of skill specialization but also the level and distribution of earnings. Matching outcomes 
affect the division of labor. 
This simple set-up links market frictions with different levels of human capital 
investments as well as uncertain income outcomes. Total training and aggregate income 
all rise as the extent of the market increases, that is, as the market thickens and 
assignment becomes more certain. This result is not surprising; however, the composition 
of human capital alters the distribution of these gains. As the extent of the market widens 
and workers become more able to locate the jobs they desire more, they specialize more 
in the acquisition of human capital. While greater specialization improves expected 
income, it exposes workers to a greater down side risk of not locating the more desired 
employment opportunity. More individuals match well but the unfortunate who do not 
locate jobs in their more desired sector have less training to fall back on and suffer lower 
incomes. As such, greater specialization increases the earnings divide between those who 
match well and those who do not. Less insurance through diversity is taken out against 
the less likely bad draw. Earnings within groups spread out and under some conditions 
leads to greater inequality.
4 Dispersion of income does not necessarily converge 
monotonically with a reduction in frictions. 
                                                 
3 Adam Smith emphasizes geographical dispersion in trading probabilities due to the extent of the market. 
Here the interpretation is on the improvement of matching over time in the frequency with which agents 
have the opportunity to trade. This specification abstracts from Adam Smith's second reason for the gain in 
productivity. There is no capital in the model so Smith's third rationale is also absent. 
 
4 Motivated by their empirical findings, Kambourov and Monovski (2004) also emphasize the importance 
of occupational human capital and matching frictions to resolve within group wage inequality variation. 
They argue, however, that increased variability of productivity shocks generate more occupational 
mobility. When coupled with experienced-related, occupation specific human capital, this shift accounts for 
a large share of overall wage inequality. Here, the simple two period model can be extended to allow for 
periodic transitions. Indeed it is possible to have mobility rise with matching rates. Such generality is left 
out in order to highlight the simplicity and intuition of proposed mechanism. Like Kambourov and 
Manovskii, occupation specific human capital is critical in this paper. 
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Although the focus of this study is on the way assignment frictions and sector specific 
human capital interact to alter the distribution of income for a particular ability group, it 
is possible to formulate comparisons across different groups by contrasting responses by 
ability. Comparisons of this sort line up with the growing disparity across groups and 
offer a complementary approach to skilled biased technological change for understanding 
the divide between groups. In particular, under standard conditions, the model also offers 
a potential explanation for the rise in inter-group heterogeneity documented in the 
literature. 
1. Some Observations 
Does better occupational matching generate greater specialization and higher within 
group earnings dispersion? Evidence on specialization and occupational specific 
matching is difficult to come by but some observations from surveys of undergraduate 
students at US universities and colleges help motivate the proposed argument. 
Table 1 documents the course credits for business, computer science and engineering 
students within and outside their field for three cohorts between 1972 and 1993. Despite 
some minor reductions in total credits, the overall pattern for these students is one in 
which they concentrate more in and around their chosen field while taking fewer outside 
options. For instance, engineers are receiving more hours of tuition in their discipline 
with fewer hours spent in disparate areas such as social science. The same general pattern 
holds in computer science and business majors albeit with slightly less clarity. The 
picture is none the less one in which students are less diversified. Based on this evidence 
bachelor degrees appear to be more concentrated in particular fields of study. 
Table 2 documents the job placement (one year out) of graduates over roughly the 
same period. It is reasonable to expect improved matching given thicker markets and 
improved information systems. Over the last forty years in the US, this appears to be the 
case. Recent college graduates have experienced higher employment rates and have 
become more likely to find work in their field of study. Taken together, this evidence 
indicates that students are specializing more and are more likely to find their desired 
employment, often in jobs very closely related to their training.   5
Table 1. 
Mean number of semester credits completed by bachelor's degree recipients, by course 
area and major: 



















                             
1972 high school 
seniors  
| 
|   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
who completed 
bachelor's   |  |    |  |  ||  |   |  |    |  
degrees by 1976  |   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
  |   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
Business and 
management    | 124.4 |  33.1 |  1.8 |  0.3 ||  8.2 |  5.9 |  16.2 |  24.4 |  26.1
Computer  science    | 133.3 |  5.0 |  25.1 |  4.0 ||  16.8 |  7.3 |  53.2 |  15.5 |  26.4
Engineering  | 134.8 |  1.2 |  1.5 |  37.1 ||  13.5 | 16.2 |  68.2 |  10.4 |  20.2
  |   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
1980 high school 
seniors   |   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
who completed 
bachelor's   |   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
degrees by 1984  |   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
  |   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
Business and 
management  | 122.8 |  33.6 |  3.7 |  0.9 ||  7.2 |  5.0 |  16.8 |  22.4 |  27.1
Computer  science  | 129.3 |  9.1 |  21.6 |  3.6 ||  16.5 |  8.0 |  49.7 |  14.7 |  26.5
Engineering    | 132.3 |  0.8 |  1.7 |  39.7 ||  12.2 | 16.1 |  69.8 |  9.3 |  20.2
  |   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
1988-89 high 
school graduates   |  |   |  |  ||  |    |    |  |  
who completed 
bachelor's   |  |   |  |  ||  |    |    |  |  
degrees by 1993  |  |   |  |  ||  |    |    |  |  
  |   |   |   |   ||   |   |   |   |  
Business and 
management  | 123.9 |  44.4 |  3.2 |  0.1 ||  6.1 |  4.8 |  14.2 |  18.7 |  31.3
Computer  science  | 127.6 |  15.7 |  26.9 |  1.9 ||  12.3 |  6.4 |  47.4 |  13.8 |  26.6
Engineering    | 136.9 |  1.4 |  5.1 |  42.3 ||  12.2 | 14.9 |  74.5 |  8.9 |  15.6
________________                             
NOTE:  All majors total includes fields not shown separately.  Because of rounding, details may not add to totals.    
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, National Longitudinal Study of    
1972; High School and Beyond; and Baccalaureate and Beyond survey.     
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The findings here can alternatively be related to differences across geographic areas. 
For instance, the stylized picture of the US economy over the last thirty years is of an 
economy with flexible labor markets (low matching frictions and hence low 
unemployment rates) as well as high but widely dispersed income growth. On the other 
hand, several European countries are generally viewed as having more rigid labor 
markets along with lower per capita income that is however more evenly distributed. The 
basic mechanism outlined in this paper suggests that these observations are consistent 
with matching frictions affecting the types of skills workers acquire and the resulting 
distribution of labor market earnings. 
2. The Economic Environment 
This section presents a (homogeneous) Roy (1951) occupational choice model with 
human capital acquisition and uncertain assignment. The model is highly stylized in order 
to highlight the basic insight and the underlying mechanism behind the idea that reducing 
matching frictions will not only increase income, productivity and employment but can 
further make income more disperse by altering investments in different types of risky 
skills.  
Table 2. 
Employment Status of Bachelor Degree Recipients, 1 Year After Graduation 
1976 to 2001 























  | | | | | | 
  | | | | | | 
  | | | | | | 
  |   |   |   |   |   |  
Percent  employed  full-time    | 67  | 71  | 73  | 74  | 74  |  84 
  |   |   |   |   |   |  
Percent employed full-time in 
a job closely related to field 




















                    
 
NOTE:  Data are from sample surveys of recent college graduates.  Data exclude bachelor's recipients from U.S. Service Schools.  
Deceased graduates and graduates living at foreign addresses at the time of the survey are not included. Data not available for 
2001 on percent of graduates employed full-time in nonprofessional jobs.  
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, "Recent College Graduates" surveys, 1976 
through 1991; and 2000/01 Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study  
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As such, market frictions and job search in this model have a broad interpretation, one 
that does not exclusively correspond to the usual notion of frictions in the job matching 
literature.
5 Assignment frictions in this model include standard job search as well as other 
experiences involved in finding the right job fit. Even after training has been completed, 
it can take a fair amount of time and effort for an individual to discover whether they 
have the aptitude, desire and inclination to make it in a given occupation. The premise is 
that these frictions have been declining over time. 
Assignment frictions may alternatively be interpreted along the lines proposed by 
Adam Smith. Suppose matching occurred repeatedly over an individual’s life so that the 
second and third life stages (described below) became repeated episodes of search and 
employment. Extending the model in this way does not alter the basic investment 
decision when workers are risk neutral as they are here. With no mobility costs across 
sectors, maximizing the discounted sum of income is equivalent to maximizing expected 
per period earnings. The probabilities of finding primary and secondary sector jobs can 
then be interpreted as the proportion of time spent in each activity.
6 
Agents  
A unit mass of risk neutral, income maximizing agents populate a Lucas island 
economy. Individuals are homogeneous. All agents possess the same innate and known 
abilities a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 for use in one of two skilled occupations or sectors. Ability ai, 
i = 1,2 is useful only in sector i and agents can work in only one sector. Agents who do 
not obtain work in either of these sectors can enter an unskilled sector where output is 
normalized to zero. 
Individuals experience three distinct life phases. In the first phase, an individual 
invests in a portfolio of occupation specific human capital skills. In the second phase, the 
individual explores islands in the economy for employment opportunities in these two 
                                                 
5 The motivating evidence above focuses fits with familiar search due to data scarcity and difficulties 
finding more general measures of assignment frictions. 
6 Allowing for multiple periods of repeated search and employment raises issues related to the 
observational content of individual income levels over time. In general, the results hold for a cross section 
of the population but observations over time are less clear cut and depend on the frequency and duration of 
the search and employment phases.   8
occupations. In the third phase, the individual chooses from the available opportunities to 
produce and consume output. 
Homogeneity focuses attention on within group differences. Given within group 
results, comparisons among heterogeneous groups follow from comparative statics with 
respect to ability. Note as well that the homogenous type specification adopted here is 
more narrow than grouping individuals by total accumulated education levels. Since there 
are a potentially large number of different (a1, a2) groups who acquire the same total 
(observed) training, using total education can muddle the picture of within group effects.  
 Human capital acquisition  
Innate ability requires training to become productive. Endowed talent in each skilled 
sector becomes effective only when combined with occupation or sector specific human 
capital (h1,h2) acquired through training in the first phase of life. Given that skills are 
sector specific, if a worker fails to receive an employment opportunity in a particular 
sector, any acquired human capital for that sector becomes redundant. Moreover, when 
choosing a (h1,h2) portfolio, individuals knowingly face the possibility that the second 
phase of search might not uncover opportunities to produce in one or both of the skilled 
sectors.  
Suppose an agent who acquires hi units at cost c per unit can potentially produce 
sector i=1,2 output aiφ(hi) where φ(h) = h
α/α and α∈(0,1). Although some results – 
those related to human capital investments – can be established for general specifications 
of the production function φ(.), the parameterization adopted here permits the finding of 
explicit expressions for individual earnings and hence economy-wide income 
distribution. Without an explicit expression for φ(.) these results would not be available. 
On the other hand, the broad results do not necessarily depend on the explicit functional 
form. Similar remarks apply for the adoption of linear utility. 
Matching  
Agents search (with recall) over islands throughout their entire second life phase. 
Each island contains an opportunity in one of the two skilled sectors. Opportunities 
within each sector are the same. Let ρ∈(0,1) represent the proportion of islands with   9
opportunities in sector 1. For example, if (as in the original Roy model) the two sectors 
are hunting and (fresh water) fishing, each island contains either a lake or a forest but not 
both. 
Normalize the duration of this second phase to a unit of continuous time and let λ  be 
the rate at which agents find new islands. As the arrival rate captures market thickness, 
the comparative static implications of having λ increase will be the focus of what 
follows. 
A constant arrival rate of islands over the second life-phase period implies that the 
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Less fortunate individuals do not find any islands and find themselves in the unskilled, 
low productivity sector. This outcome occurs with probability 
λ π λ
− = = e p 0 0 ) ( 
With probability 
) ( ) ( 1 2 1
) 1 ( λ λ
λ ρ λ λρ p p e e e = + − −
− − − −  
agents are fortunate and find islands with both types of employment. 
Production and consumption  
In the third phase of life, individuals produce and consume. To keep things 
straightforward, assume that agents consume their own production. Production goods are 
perfect substitutes. The absence of meaningful exchange at this stage prevents prices 
from adjusting in response to different allocations of agents across islands. This 
restriction, however, is not critical. It is possible to generate the basic results found here 
with more general preferences and trade that enable prices to adjust as agents’ 
opportunities vary over time. The mechanism is less transparent and not developed here. 
Individuals who find only one type of skilled occupation or do not find any skilled 
production opportunities have simple choices. When only one skilled sector opportunity 
is available, the lone skilled opportunity will be taken, provided any skills have been 
developed. Individuals with both skilled opportunities available have a slightly more 
complicated problem. They choose their most profitable occupation to work in based on 
abilities and human capital investments. 
3. Investment and Specialization 
Market thickness along with innate abilities determine human capital decisions and 
the resulting distribution of (within group) income. An individual, endowed with talent in 
two distinct areas, initially allocates resources to separately develop these raw abilities. 
For example, depending on talent and job prospects, a university student may diversify 
by choosing to major in chemistry and minor in music. On the other hand, if the 
employment outlook in music is bleak, the student may forgo diversity and specialize 
even more in chemistry. With non-scholastic training, some professionals may choose to   11
earn a number of highly specialized and closely related qualifications - say by obtaining 
particular technical qualifications. Once training is complete, the individual looks for 
offers. In the musician/chemist example, the individual may come across places to play 
music or to work at a lab. In some instances, both opportunities turn up and the worker 
can choose which to pursue. In other instances, no opportunities exist and the individual 
works in the unskilled sector. 
An agent with a choice of occupations will opt for the one generating the greatest 
income. Given human capital training decisions, sector 1 is chosen if and only if 
) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 h a h a φ φ ≥  
The nontrivial decision an individual faces is to chose sector specific investments h1 and 
h2 to maximize expected income : 
) ( )} ( ), ( max{
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1
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2 1
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where agents take the matching probabilities p1 = p1(λ) and p2 = p2(λ) exogenously. 
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EY1 = p1a1φ(h1) + p2(1-p1)a2φ(h2) - c(h1 + h2) 
and  
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Given these solutions, EY1 ≥ EY2 if and only if condition (1) holds. Note as well that 
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a condition that holds if (1) holds. If (1) holds with equality, (3) is, of course, also a 
solution.■  
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     ( 4 )  
ranks occupations. If this condition holds, sector 1 becomes the primary occupation or 
major field and sector 2 becomes the secondary occupation or minor field. Note that a 
preference for sector 1 does not imply hi ≥ h-i, that is, observing h1 > h2 does not imply 
that sector i is preferred. A low probability of matching coupled with sufficiently high   13
ability in a sector can induce less training for that sector but if the choice arises, the high 
ability induces the worker to prefer that sector.
7 
Depending on abilities, individuals may switch their favored sector as markets 
become thicker. The partition from (4) rotates as λ evolves. In the limit as markets 
become very thick, λ → ∞, frictions disappear and this condition simplifies to a1 ≥ a2. 
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In very thin markets with ρ < 1/2, agents prefer sector 1 provided their innate talent for 
that sector is sufficiently high – a1/a2 > [(1−ρ)/ρ]
α. For intermediate cases where  
1 < a1/a2 < [(1−ρ)/ρ]
α, 
and λ is small, agents prefer sector 2 but as markets thicken and λ increases they will at 
some point prefer sector 1. As shown in the appendix, (4) is monotonic in λ so that this 
switch can occur at most once. 
Since individuals may switch sectors as markets expand, two steps are considered in 
order to gauge the effects of market thickness. The first step considers the impact of 
market growth for a given (a1, a2) within a preferred sector, that is without a change in 
the primary sector. As illustrated below, a rise (over time for instance) in matching 
probabilities represented by a rise in λ not only induces an increase in overall training, (a 
natural result), but also alters the composition of the human capital portfolio. Expected 
income rises in thicker markets but the dispersion changes as well. The second step 








−λ/(1−α) > 1 
then any individual who prefers sector 1, that is satisfies (1), will have h1 < h2, a condition that is 
independent of ability and holds for λ sufficiently small.   14
Within sector impact  
Suppose (a1, a2) and λ are such that p1(λ)a1 is sufficiently large relative to p2(λ)a2 to 
make a1φ(h1) > a2φ(h2). Sector 1 is the primary sector. The impact of market thickness is 
straightforward. Primary sector human capital 
) 1 /( 1
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as markets become thicker. Improved employment probabilities induce workers to invest 
more in the primary sector. 
On the other hand, the likelihood of ending up in the secondary sector depends on the 
probability of not finding a primary sector position as well as the probability of finding a 
secondary sector opportunity. As a result, investment in secondary occupation skills 
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will rise or fall depending on the way in which the overall likelihood of winding up in the 
secondary sector evolves. In particular, 
) )( 1 (
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Secondary occupation training rises as markets thicken from relatively thin positions, that 









Although secondary training may either rise or fall, the increase in primary training is 
always sufficiently large so that both total investment in human capital, h1+h2, and the 
portfolio spread, h1 - h2, increase with λ. The impact of matching frictions on   15
specialization, defined here as the proportion of total human capital in the primary sector 
(even though it is feasible that h1 < h2), follows accordingly. 
0
2 1












As primary sector matching becomes more likely, workers become more specialized. 
(See the appendix for details.) 
This pattern of human capital portfolio decision making aligns with Adam Smith's 
idea that workers become more specialized as the markets become thicker in the sense 
that there are better trading opportunities, at least in the primary occupations of 
individuals. 
"The division of labor ...occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the 
productive powers of labor. The separation of different trades and employments 
from one another, seems to have taken place, in consequence of this advantage. 
This separation too is generally carried furthest in those countries which enjoy the 
highest degree of industry " (p. 5)  
Sector shifting  
As market thickness rotates (1), the preferred sector can change. Such a switch has no 
impact on the total amount of training acquired; however, the portfolio becomes more 
balanced. 
When (1) holds with equality, individuals do not favor a particular sector; however, 
those who opt for making sector 1 their preferred choice acquire the same total level of 
training as those who opt for sector 2: 
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At the occupational partition, total acquired training, h1+h2, is continuous not only in 
abilities but also in matching probabilities and hence market thickness λ. 
Although switching sectors has no effect on the level of total training, discrete 
changes occur in sector specific investments, employment rates and specialization. In the 
newly preferred sector, investments and employment jump up whereas the old preferred 
sector experiences a discrete drop. The more interesting concern is whether the portfolio 
becomes more or less balanced. 
Suppose 
/
2 h  satisfies (3) and thus denotes the choice of sector 2 training when sector 
2 is the primary sector. If (1) holds with equality, then 









































Since total training remains constant, it immediately follows that the portfolio spread in 
training as well as specialization depend on whether p1 > p2 at the switching point for 
(a1,a2). Consider a switch from preferring sector 2 to preferring sector 1. It must be the 
case that  
1 < a1/a2 < [(1−ρ)/ρ]
α, 
and ρ < 1/2. It then follows that when the switch occurs, 
/
2 1 h h < . In other words, after 
the change occurs, investment becomes more even across potential occupations. 
Individuals appear less specialized when the fallback option turns into the primary 
occupation. 
4. Income 
Human capital adjustments lead directly to changes in the expected value as well as 
the distribution of income. As noted above, total investment in human capital increases as 
the extent of the market, captured by λ, grows and the pi rise. Suppose again that a1 > a2 
and  λ are such that sector 1 is preferred. Higher investments yield higher mean or 
expected (gross) earnings 
EY = p1a1φ(h1) + p2(1-p1)a2φ(h2) =  c(h1 + h2)/α   17
as well as total higher employment in skilled occupations. 
A more interesting pattern, one that reflects the changing job prospects of workers in 
the primary and secondary occupations, emerges when considering the impact of 
matching on the (within group) distribution of income. With better primary job prospects, 
investments become more specialized. Individuals who obtain positions in the (more 
likely) primary occupation have more skills and hence greater earnings. The less 
fortunate who wind up with their second choice have relatively less secondary training. 
Recall that ∂(h1 – h2)/ ∂λ < 0. Indeed, it may turn out to be the case that these secondary 
sector workers acquire absolutely less training if ∂h2/∂λ < 0. In either case, the spread in 






































Income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, can likewise rise or fall as the 
market thickens. Given (a1, a2), the Gini for earned income is 
EY
G
20 10 12 Δ + Δ + Δ
=  
where 
Δ12 = p1(1-p1)p2[a1φ(h1) – a2φ(h2)] 
Δ10 = p1(1-p1)(1-p2)a1φ(h1) 
Δ20 = p2(1-p1)
2(1-p2)a2φ(h2) 
represent the respective income differences between sectors 1 and 2, between sector 1 
and the unskilled sector, and between sector 2 and the unskilled sector, each multiplied 
by the number of people involved. 
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The impact of market thickness on this Gini decomposes into the direct effects of 
matching probabilities (p1, p2) and the indirect changes to portfolio specialization. The 


















Fewer individuals obtain low paying unskilled jobs and more earn primary sector skilled 
pay. These transitions lower inequality. If individuals maintained their initial investment 
levels, the Gini would decline as more individuals entered the primary sector. 
The accompanying rise in specialization, on the other hand, causes greater income 
inequality. As primary sector matching improves, skilled income spreads creating greater 
inequality among the high and low earners, thereby offsetting the income equality gains 
that come directly from better matching prospects. Abusing notation somewhat, the effect 


















The net effect is ambiguous. For λ sufficiently large, this derivative is negative. 
Nearly all individuals are earning high, primary sector earnings. On the other hand, it is 
straightforward to find cases where earnings inequality increases with λ. For example, 
given (a1, a2, α, ρ) = (12, 4, 0.75, 0.15), the derivative of the Gini evaluated at λ = 1.80 is 
roughly 0.127. 
Figure 1 traces out the way in which earnings inequality in this example varies with 
λ. Following the sector switch that generates a discrete positive jump, the Gini exhibits 
an inverted U-shape progression as matching improves. This progression, however, is not 
unique. A variety of shapes emerge from varying the parameters. For instance, suppose in 
this example the proportion of sector 1 islands rises to ρ = 0.19 which is sufficiently large   19
to make sector 1 the primary sector for all λ. In this new configuration, the Gini decreases 
for low and high λ but increases over an interior range of λ, thereby creating a local max. 
For  ρ =0.25 in this example, the local max does not occur. Earnings inequality is 























These examples reveal that improved matching associated with thicker markets do 
not necessarily lead to predictions of either more or less earnings equality.   
Sector switching  
By construction, agents have equal expected income when the evolution of λ induces 
a move from preferring one occupation to the other. Income dispersion, however, is 




1 , , S h h denote the human capital acquisitions 
and the spread between primary and secondary income given sector 2 is favored. The 
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where use has been made of the equality of equation (1).   20
Recall that if an individual switches primary sectors from sector 2 to sector 1, it must 
be the case, among other things, that p1 < p2. Given this restriction, it is then 
straightforward to establish that S – S
/ > 0 if and only if α >1/2. 
Two factors underlie this outcome. As shown above, when individuals switch their 
preferred sector, they invest more evenly in occupational human capital. The more 
balanced portfolio reduces the income spread. On the other hand, after the switch occurs, 
individuals are now investing in their innately more gifted ability - a shift from sector 2 to 
sector 1 requires abilities such that 1 < a1/a2 < [(1−ρ)/ρ]
α where ρ < 1/2. Increased 
investment in higher innate ability spreads primary and secondary income. The net effect 
depends on the curvature of the human capital production function. 
The Gini can likewise rise or fall at the occupational switch. As individuals swap 
sectors, a discrete jump occurs. Suppose G and G
/ represent the Gini when occupation 1 
and occupation 2 are the preferred sector. Since total investments are equal at the 
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It is not difficult to find examples in which the earnings inequality jump from this 
expression can discretely rise or fall when agents switch sectors.  
5. Comparisons Across Types 
To assess differences in earnings across groups, the paper turns now to the way in 
which changes (induced by market expansion) in expected gross earnings as well as 
changes in the distribution of earnings vary by ability.
8 Although definite predictions do 
not emerge for all λ, the analysis demonstrates the way in which thicker markets can 
provide greater benefits on average for the more well-off as well as create more 
                                                 
8The difference between gross and net income is given by training costs. Since EY = c(h1+h2)/α this 
distinction involves a constant fraction independent of ability and matching rates. The results do not differ 
in a substantive way using either net or gross income. 
   21
pronounced dispersion within more affluent groups, results that accord with some recent 
observations mentioned above.
9 
Again assume that agents all prefer the same sector - sector 1 - and consider first the 
relationship between ability and the changes in expected income due to market 
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If groups differ in primary sector abilities, the resulting difference in expected income 
becomes more pronounced as matching prospects improve. The more able have more to 
gain from better matching and this difference shows up directly in ∂
2EY/∂λ∂a1. 
The picture is less transparent when the discrepancy in abilities lies in the secondary 
sector. The impact of market expansion mirrors the events occurring in the secondary 
sector human capital acquisition. In thin markets (where λ < -lnρ/(1-ρ) and ∂h2/∂λ>0), 
market expansion increases the overall likelihood of being in that sector. The more able 
secondary sector workers are positioned to take greater advantage of the expanding 
market. As a result, expected earnings differentials rise as market thickness expands: 
∂
2EY/∂λ∂a2 > 0. In thicker markets where λ >  -lnρ/(1-ρ), the converse holds. Individuals 
have lower expectations of winding up in the secondary sector. The change is more 
prominent for more able workers causing earnings disparity across groups to decline with 
market thickness. 
    Income dispersion across groups can be assessed in a similar way. The income spread 
among skilled workers S = a1φ(h1) - a2φ(h2) responds as investment and expected income 
respond to market thickness: 
                                                 
9 Due to the particular specification of φ(h), the return to education is EY/(h₁+h₂)=c/α is constant with 
respect to matching. A more general specification allows for an increasing or decreasing return.   22
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The spread in earnings becomes more pronounced between groups who differ in their 
primary sector ability. The skilled income spread becomes less pronounced with changes 
that raise secondary sector human capital acquisition. The mechanisms behind these 
results follow the logic behind the across group earning differentials. 
        The relationship between the changing spread and abilities does not entirely carry 
through to changes in earnings inequality. When matching frictions decline, the impact 
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These cross partials have similar forms that differ in sign and by ai. The sign of  Λ 
depends on both e
-λ − ρe
−λρ and h1 – h2. For λ small, e
-λ − ρe
−λρ > 0 and h1 – h2 < 0. These 
factors switch sign at different values of λ, so comparisons across groups do not exhibit 
clear patterns. However, Λ < 0 as markets become sufficiently thick, so that dispersion 
rises (falls) among groups that are ordered by increasing primary (secondary) ability. 
Although the Gini is a more involved measure of dispersion than the spread in earnings, 
the driving factors none the less can be seen at play in the Gini results. 
6. Discussion 
Over the last hundred years, income has grown steadily yet the distribution has 
exhibited an uneven progression, see for example Goldin and Katz, (1999) and Goldin   23
and Margo (1992). While a number of opposing factors may be at play, this paper argues 
that this pattern can follow from a gradual improvement of matching rates in different 
occupations. A smooth convergence or divergence should not necessarily be expected as 
the evolution of the distribution of income can exhibit arbitrary patterns. 
The key factor is within group specialization in sector specific human capital. 
Improved matching in the primary sector generates greater specialization which in turn 
leads to greater income disparity between the well matched and the poorly matched. 
Increased residual disparity is more pronounced among the more able. 
Other factors undeniably alter the distribution of income, both within and across 
groups. The mechanism outlined here complements these other factors by offering a 
simple explanation for the rise of within group earnings dispersion.   24
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APPENDIX 
 
This appendix presents the details for the comparative statics discussed in the text. To 
ease notation in what follows, let θ = 1/(1−α) > 1 
 
Claim 1: Equation (4) is monotonic in λ. 
Proof : Two intermediate results are first established.  
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It is thus sufficient to show  
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Taking logs gives 
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since θ > 1. Therefore, A – B + C – D > 0 for all ρ < ½. 














































hence A – B + C – D < 0 for all ρ > ½.  QED 
 
Claim 2: Total human capital accumulation is increasing in market thickness: 
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where the inequality above derives from (4). Define  
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− − − − − + − ≡ e e e G . Since G2(0) = G2(1) = 0 and  
G2
//(ρ ) = -(λθ)2e
-λ(1−ρ)θ < 0, 
it follows that G2(ρ) > 0 for all ρ∈(0,1). It then follows that G1(θ) > 0 which is 
sufficient to establish the claim QED. 
 

















































































=    28
where H(ρ) = ρ(1-e
-λ) + e
−λ – e
−λ(1−ρ) . H(0) = H(1) = 0 and H
//(ρ) = -λ
2e
−λ(1−ρ) < 0 imply 
that H(ρ) > 0 for all ρ∈(0,1) QED. 
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given (4) holds. Since G1(θ) defined in Claim 2 is increasing in θ, we need only establish 
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0, K(ρ) > 0 for all ρ∈(0,1).   QED 
 